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Abstract
We model the decentralised defence choice of agents connected in a directed graph
and exposed to an external threat. The network allows players to receive goods
from one or more producers through directed paths. Each agent is endowed with
a finite and divisible defence resource that can be allocated to their own security or
to that of their peers. The external threat is represented by either a random attack
on one of the nodes or by an intelligent attacker who aims to maximise the flow-
disruption by seeking to destroy one node. We show that under certain conditions
a decentralised defence allocation is efficient when we assume the attacker to be
strategic: a centralised allocation of defence resources which minimises the flow-
disruption coincides with a decentralised equilibrium allocation. On the other
hand, when we assume a random attack, the decentralised allocation is likely to
diverge from the central planner’s allocation.
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1 Introduction
A vast literature has extensively studied the characteristics of games known as Conflicts on
Multiple Battlefields or Colonel Blotto games1. In these games, one or multiple defendants de-
fend multiple locations by optimally choosing how to allocate defence resources across them-
selves, while an intelligent attacker aims to conquer as many of them as possible. One of the
most important results of these models highlights how a centralised defence allocation is
usually more efficient than a decentralised one since it can exploit the negative externalities
across multiple locations in order to attract the attacker toward the least valuable ones; indi-
vidual players fail to internalize the cost of their defence allocation and thus over-invest in
defensive measures.
More recently, new contributions have analyzed these games in a network setting (Ace-
moglu et al. (2016), Dziubiński & Goyal (2017), Goyal & Vigier (2014) and Cerdeiro et al.
(2017)). In these models, payoff of the players is generally tied to a network structure which
connects some of them. This has been motivated by the fact that connections and the archi-
tecture of social and economic networks impact decisions of individuals, firms, and countries
in various contexts.2 For example, an agent may find it beneficial to be part of a large con-
nected component since it may grant him access to a relatively larger amount of goods or to
multiple destinations. On the other hand, a terrorist group may aim to disrupt a network
infrastructure to damage the welfare of a society which depends on it.
Along the same lines, we propose a model of conflicts where a set of players (defendants)
is connected by a directed network structure, and a (unique) attacker aims to maximally
disrupt the network by attacking one of its nodes/players. Each defendant benefits from
being part of the network as it gives him the possibility to receive goods produced by one
or more peers. Each defendant is also endowed of a divisible defence resource which can
be transferred to other players. The game is sequential: in the first stage the defendants
optimally and simultaneously allocate their defence resources, while in the second stage the
attacker chooses the node to attack.
We analyze two scenarios. In the first, which we call the Strategic Scenario (S1), the at-
tacker is strategic and chooses his target in order to maximally disrupt the network given the
choices of the defendants. In the second, the Non-Strategic Scenario (S0), a node is attacked
according to a known probability distribution. By comparing the resulting equilibrium de-
1See Kovenock & Roberson (2010), Bier (2006) and Sandler & Enders (2004) for surveys and the works by
Bier et al. (2007), Lapan & Sandler (1993), Sandler et al. (2003), Keohane & Zeckhauser (2003), Kunreuther &
Heal (2003), and Heal & Kunreuther (2004).
2See Jackson et al. (2008).
Decentralised Defence of a (Directed) Network Structure 3
fence allocations in the two scenarios, we remark that the “strategic element” is an important
element to guarantee the efficiency of the decentralized equilibrium.
We first show that when the attacker is strategic, nodes would share defence resources
proportionally to their criticality3. More interestingly, we can show that under certain condi-
tions the decentralized defence allocation is efficient; it coincides with the defence allocation
which minimizes the expected network disruption. On the other hand, when the attack is
probabilistic, this will not necessarily be the case; nodes which are more critical may end
up being less defended than less critical ones. These results complete and, to some extent,
challenge the existing literature.
The intuition behind the first result goes as follows. The directed nature of the network
creates a topological ordering on each path connecting a player to a producer. This implies
that for each player, his survival and that of any other player in the same path who is crucial
to connect him to a producer are equally important. On the other hand, all things being equal,
a strategic attacker would prefer to eliminate the most critical nodes. Under certain condi-
tions, this will imply that (i) more critical nodes will receive relatively more defence resources
from other peers (Proposition 1), and (ii) the interests of players in the same path will be co-
ordinated, thereby aligning the decentralized allocation to a centralized one (Proposition 2).
Loosely speaking, this is possible since the criticality of a player implies that a relatively large
number of peers would be willing to defend him, thus he might be able to receive enough
defence resources such that other less critical players would eventually become equally at-
tractive to the attacker. When this does occur, this coincides with the allocation criteria of a
planner. On the other hand, when the attacker is not strategic but probabilistic, each player
would allocate defence to a peer only if the peer is essential to them, and proportionally to
their probability of being attacked. In other words, the probability of being attacked, and
not the players’ criticality, is essentially the unique element which affects a player’s defence
allocation choice. Conversely, a planner would still take into account the criticality of each
node. This is the reason why, in general, under random attack, decentralized and centralized
defence allocations are likely to not coincide (Proposition 4).
Dziubiński & Goyal (2017), Acemoglu et al. (2016), Goyal & Vigier (2014), and Cerdeiro
et al. (2017) are among the closest papers to ours. They study a sequential game in which
a designer moves first and chooses a defence allocation, and in a second stage the adversary
chooses how to allocate attack-resources across the nodes. In Cerdeiro et al. (2017), the au-
thors also discuss how the designer could optimally design the network in order to solve
3As we will show in the next sections, a node is more critical if by removing it from the network it has
relatively larger impact on the utility of the rest of the nodes.
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possible inefficiencies arising when security choices are decentralized. In particular, the au-
thors show that decentralised security choices could lead to both over and under-investment
in security. In all these works, a strategic attacker targets one node in order to minimise the
connectivity of the structure.4 The main differences with our setting are the following. First,
our assumption over the value of the network as perceived by its nodes differs. In our set-
ting, a player profits from being part of a component as far as it allows him to be connected
to some producers. In the works previously mentioned, the value of a component is function
of its size. A direct consequence of this is that, in our setting, a player might not be affected
by the elimination of a node in the same component if this node is not essential to connect
the player to a producer. Second, the nature of the attack differs. In Cerdeiro et al. (2017), an
attack might eliminate a node and propagate to other peers via existing links, and in Goyal
& Vigier (2014) the attacker can navigate the network by successfully eliminating multiple
nodes in multiple rounds. In our setting, there is no contagion and the game terminates af-
ter an attack is carried out. This implies again that, as long as the target is not crucial to a
player to receive goods, its survival does not impact the player’s utility. Although we do
not study the optimal network design problem, this difference might also have the following
intuitive consequences. In Cerdeiro et al. (2017), under strategic attack, in order to incentivise
individual nodes to not under-invest in security, a central planner might find it optimal to
design a dense network which would make the risk of contagion more likely. In our setting,
by making a network more dense, a central planner would only (weakly) reduce the num-
ber of likely targets, eventually attracting possible attacks uniquely toward the producer(s).
Finally, in the works mentioned, to produce security is costly and the amount of defence
produced is a strategic choice. As pointed out by the same authors, this assumption is par-
ticularly suitable to describe immunization decision problems.5 Instead, we focus attention
on the reallocation of existing security resources between nodes by allowing them to share
defence resources. As pointed out in section 5, when studying the problem of decentralized
defence of a network structure, two types of inefficiencies might arise. On one hand, individ-
ual players might choose to produce inefficient levels of security (over or under-investment
in defence). This usually might arise when each player fail to internalize the impact of his
choice on the rest of the peers and when security decisions are strategic complementary. On
the other hand, if allowed to share defence resources with other players, for similar reasons,
4Variations of the same problem have been studied by Varian (2004) and Aspnes et al. (2006).
5There are other notable studies about network flow interdiction problems such as Hong (2011), Wood (1993),
Washburn & Wood (1995), Reijnierse et al. (1996), Kalai & Zemel (1982), Israeli & Wood (2002). There also exists a
vast literature in operations research and computer science about network defence, for instance Alpcan & Başar
(2010), Smith (2010), and Zhu & Levinson (2012).
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individual nodes might also inefficiently allocate defence resources. The first type has been
the focus of the works mentioned above. Here, we concentrate on the second type of ineffi-
ciency, and in order to do so, we separate the individual defence-production problem from
the resource-sharing one.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces some network notation. Section
3 introduces the model. Section 4 presents the main results. In section 5 we discusses the
impact of some network modification on the welfare of the players as well as the alternative
assumption of variable costs. Section 6 concludes.
2 Network notation and definitions
A directed network G(N, L) is composed by a set of nodes N = {1, ..., n} with n ≥ 2 and a
set of directed links L such that ij ∈ L means that there exists a directed link from i to j nodes.
A path between two nodes i and j, Pij, is a sequence of nodes i1, i2, ..., ik such that i1 = i and
ik = j, and ii2, i2i3, ..., ik−1 j ∈ L. Two nodes are connected if there exists a path between them.
A cycle is a path Pij where i = j. We define the set of predecessor nodes, Bi ⊂ N, as the subset
of nodes which can reach i by a path. Similarly the set of successor nodes or follower, Fi ⊂ N,
the subset of nodes which can be reached from i through a path. We say that a node i is a jq-
middleman node if and only if i ∈ Pjq for any Pjq, or there are no paths from j to q which do not
involve node i. Thus, we say that i is a middleman if and only if i is jq-middleman for at least
one ordered pair (j, q) of nodes.6 We define a node i such that Fi = ∅, or who does not have
any followers, a sink node. The out-degree of a node i, δ+i , is the number of links departing
from i, while the in-degree, δ−i , the number of links received by i. A star graph is a graph where
a central node is connected to the rest of the players which are uniquely connected to him. A
core-periphery graph is a graph similar to the star graph where a subset of players composes
the core and are connected to the rest of peripheral players. A directed acyclic graph (or acyclic
digraph) is a directed graph with no cycles. With abuse of notation, we indicate G − i the
graph obtained from G by removing the node i and any relative link. We finally define by G
the set of directed networks.
6This definition of middleman may coincide with the widely studied betweenness centrality. However,
this is not necessary. The betweenness centrality is measured by considering the shortest paths between two
nodes, if more than one, while a node is a jq-middleman if any path from j to q passes through him. In other
words, a jq-middleman would necessarily score a positive betweenness centrality level while a node with positive
betweenness centrality score may not be a middleman.
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3 Model
There is a set of (n + 1) players, M = N ∪ {A}, where N is the set of players, which we
simply call defendants, connected in a directed network G(N, L) with n ≥ 2, and A is a player
which we simply call attacker. We call a non-empty subset of nodes O ⊆ N the set of producer
nodes. Each player s ∈ O produces a quantity xs > 0 of a good, which can travel through the
network via the existing directed paths starting from s. Which is, if there exists a path Psi in
the network G, player i receives the quantity xs produced by s. Later we will define in details
the preferences of each player in N.7
Definition 1. A directed network G with non-empty set of producer O is connected if and only if for
each s ∈ O there exists at least one path Psi to each i /∈ O.
This definition will be particularly useful for some of the following results such as proposi-
tions 2 and 4. Each node is endowed of a unit of a divisible and transferable resource d which
we call defence resource. We define Di = dii + ∑j 6=i dji, the total defence resources owned by i,
where dji indicates the resource transferred by j to i. We assume that d is non-transferrable to
third nodes, which is dji received by i from j cannot be transferred again to q 6= j.
3.1 Conflict
We analyse the two following scenarios:
• Non Strategic Attack (S0): One node in N is randomly attacked according to a proba-
bility distribution over the nodes set P(i) with i ∈ N.
• Strategic Attack (S1): One node in N is attacked by A who aims to maximally disrupt
the network.
We specify the technology of conflict. We assume that the attacker A always attacks with a
constant intensity β > 0.
A node i owning Di total defence, if attacked, survives with probability α(Di) which is
defined by a classic Tullock contest function8,
7To exclude trivial cases, we can assume that any producer has strictly positive out-degree and any non-
producer strictly positive in-degree.
8See Tullock (2001).





with parameter γ ∈ (0, 1] and β > 0 constant intensity of attack. With probability 1− α(Di),
the node is destroyed and thus removed from G. The function α(Di) naturally captures the
ability to resist an attack making it proportional to the relative defence ability of the targeted
node i and the one of the attacker. Moreover, the restriction imposed on the parameter γ
guarantees strict concavity of α(D) for all D ≥ 0, or diminishing returns to defence.








where Bi ∩O is the subset of producers who are also predecessors of i, or the producers who
are connected to i. We assume f (·) concave such that f ′(·) > 0, f (0) = 0, and f (nxs)/ f (xs) ≤
2 for any n ≥ 2. In particular, the last condition guarantees that the marginal benefit of being
connected to an additional producer is positive but small enough. This assumption simplifies
the analysis and makes the problem tractable. If not holding, we could have two players who
are equally crucial to other peers even if one connects few nodes to many producers while
the other connects many nodes to few producers. This possibility complicates the analysis
in a non trivial way and might be relevant only in cases where a single producer could not
satisfy the demand of each receiver node. Summarising, player i benefits from being part
of a component proportionally to the number of producers who can reach her via a path. If
no such path exists, then there is no benefit from being part of the network. Thus, we can
naturally compute the network total value function simply as V(G) = ∑i∈N vi(G).
We remark that (1) is a generalization of the network value functions considered in Dziu-
biński & Goyal (2017), Goyal & Vigier (2014), and Cerdeiro et al. (2017). If we assume undi-
rected graphs, or a node can reach any other node of the same a component, and each node
is also a producer (O = N), then the argument of the function f (·) is essentially a multiple of
the component’s size.9 On the other hand, by assuming (1), we might also be able to describe
cases where some path is not available, or where some node may be a simple receiver or an
intermediary, i.e. where belonging to a network matters as long as it gives access to specific
nodes by a path.10
9In such a case, we can also safely drop the condition f (nxs)/ f (xs) ≤ 2 for any n ≥ 2 imposed on f (·).
10This may well describe the cases of trade networks, or infrastructure networks for example. Few countries
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Finally, we define the node i’s disruption value Ṽi = V(G) − V(G − i). In words, Ṽi de-
scribes the potential impact of removing i from G on the defendants’ valuation of the net-
work. We can now describe the game in more detail.
3.2 Game setup
We consider a two-stage sequential game. In both S0 and S1, in the first stage the nodes
simultaneously choose their defence allocation, while in the second stage one of the nodes
is attacked. In S0 this node is randomly picked among N according to P(i), while in S1, the
attacker optimally chooses a target node given the choices in the first stage.
Each node i simultaneously chooses a strategy which is vector xi = (di1, ..., din) with dij ≥
0 and dii + ∑j 6=i dij ≤ 1. Thus the strategy space for each i is Si = [0, 1]n and S = S1 × ...× Sn
the set of strategies. A defendant profile is SD = (x1, x2, ..., xn).
We focus now on the strategic scenario S1. Given SD, the attacker chooses an attack profile
SA = (σ1, ..., σn), where σi is the probability to attack node i ∈ N. When σi = 1, we refer to a
pure strategy.
Given the strategy profile (SD, SA), the expected payoff of a node i is
Ui(G, SD, SA) = ∑
j∈N
σj[αj(Dj)(vi(G)− vi(G− j)) + vi(G− j)]
In other words, if the attacker attacks and destroys a node j which is critical to i in order to
receive xs from a producer s, player i gets utility vi(G− j) < vi(G). On the other hand, if j is
not critical and/or j successfully survives the attack, then payoff of i simply reduces to vi(G).
We assume that if i is attacked and removed from G, then Ui(G− i, SD, SA) = 0.
The expected payoff of attacker A under (SD, SA) is
φ(G, SD, SA) = ∑
i∈N
σi(1− αi(Di))Ṽi
All things being equal, φ(·) has highest value when A attacks and destroys a node i such
that V(G− i) = 0, and lowest when i is such that Ṽi = vi(G). In other words, the attacker’s
own and export natural resources. The value of belonging to the trade network of a natural resource is linked
exclusively to the existence of a trade path from the producer to the final country-consumer.
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expected payoff increases with the chances of winning the conflict and with the expected
disruption caused by the elimination of a target node.
A strategy profile (S∗D, S
∗
A) is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) if and only if
• Ui(G, S∗D, S
∗
A) ≥ Ui(G, SD, S∗A) for all i ∈ N and SD 6= S∗D, and
• φ(G, S∗D, S
∗
A) ≥ φ(G, S∗D, SA) for all SA 6= S∗A.
We focus on the SPNE of the game.
4 Results
We start by assuming the strategic scenario S1. The first result shows that in any SPNE and
network G, we expect an equilibrium defence profile which allocates defence resources to the
nodes as proportionally to their disruption values.
Proposition 1. Consider scenario S1. An equilibrium profile (S∗D, S
∗
A) exists and it is such that for







with k ≡ Ṽi/Ṽj, thus i and j are defended proportionally to their disruption values.
Proof: The existence is guaranteed by the fact that in the second stage, S∗A is always a best
response to S∗D, and in the first stage, the game played by the defendants has at least one
NE since Si is a compact, convex subset of [0, 1]n, and Ui(·) is continuous in (S1, ..., Sn) and
quasiconcave in Si. To see that D∗i ≥ D∗j for all i, j ∈ N such that σi = σj > 0 and Ṽi ≥ Ṽj,
observe that if A randomizes over i and j, then it must be that φ(S∗D, i, G) = φ(S
∗
D, j, G), or
(1− αi(D∗i ))Ṽi = (1− αj(D∗j ))Ṽj
Thus, D∗i ≥ D∗j , with equality holding only in the case Ṽi = Ṽj. Rearranging, we obtain the
expression for D∗i as stated above where it is easy to check that D
∗
i is proportional to Ṽi.
The intuition is fairly simple. The attacker attacks more than one node with positive
probability only if he finds them equally attractive. This means that if the attacker targets
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two nodes of different disruption value with equal probability, it must be that the node with
the higher disruption value is getting relatively more defence from other peers. Moreover,
if multiple nodes are equally crucial to a player in order to be connected to a producer, he
would find it optimal to transfer resources to them in a way that would make the attacker
indifferent to attack either one of them; if the attacker was instead attacking one of these
nodes with probability one and the player could divert some of his defence resources to the
target, he would profitably do so.
We are going to check if the equilibrium defence allocation is efficient or if it coincides
with the allocation chosen by a central planner aiming to minimize the expected network
disruption.
Consider the following game played by a central planner (CP) against the attacker A. The
CP and A sequentially choose a defence allocation and a target node respectively. Which is,
the CP chooses a vector D = (D1, ..., Dn) with Di ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and ∑i Di = n, and, similar
to the previous setting, the attacker chooses a distribution over the nodes in N given D.
The expected payoff of the attacker is not changed while the CP’s expected payoff is simply
π(D, SA, G) = −φ(D, SA, G). We study the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria (De, SeA). We
call an equilibrium defence allocation De an efficient defence allocation.
Proposition 2. Consider scenario S1. For any connected G where the nodes with highest disruption
value are from the producer set, the centralized equilibrium profile (De, SeA) coincides with the decen-
tralized one. Moreover, any decentralized equilibrium where the attacker randomizes over multiple
nodes is unique.
Proof: Recall that connected G means that each producer can reach any other non producer
player in G. Define mq ≥ 1 the number of nodes depending on a node q to receive any good
from a producer. Recall that, by the concavity assumption we made on f (·), Ṽq > Ṽj implies
mq > mj, or node q has strictly higher disruption value than node j only if q is crucial to more
nodes than j in order to be connected to a producer.
The case where the CP allocates all the resources to a unique producer s and σes = 1 is easy
to check. This would imply that
(1− α(n))Ṽs > Ṽi
for all i 6= s. Thus, being s crucial to any player in N, those would find it beneficial to send
their own resource to s - any deviation from this would not change the response of A while
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lowering the producer’s defence. We are going to consider only cases when the centralized
defence allocation implies that A would optimally randomize over at least two nodes, or best
response σes = σei > 0 for at least another node i 6= s. Without loss of generality, consider
the case of one producer s and one middleman node i. The argument for more than one
producer and in general more targets would be similar. If in a decentralized setting the CP
finds optimal to allocate resources over nodes such that σes = σei = 1/2, it must be that
(1− α(Des))Ṽs = (1− α(Dei ))Ṽi
Suppose De 6= S∗D and thus Dei 6= D∗i . In particular, let’s start by considering the case Dei >
D∗i . If this was the case, in the decentralized setting the attacker would optimally attack i
with probability σ∗i = 1. Moreover, since mi players depend on i, they would all profitably
send resources to i, thus D∗i = mi and D
e
i = mi + ε > D
∗
i , for some ε > 0. This means that in
the centralized setting it must hold
(1− α(n−mi − ε))Ṽs = (1− α(mi + ε))Ṽi
However, this is false for any ε ≥ 0 when ms > mi and ms + mi > n, which is always
satisfied. In particular, in order to be σes = σei , less than mi resources needs to be allocated to
i and more than n− mi to s. This is due to the fact that Ṽq increases linearly with mq while
α(D) increases by less than a unit for each unit defence resource added. Thus, if Dei = mi + ε,
optimal response of A in the centralized setting would be to attack s with probability one, a





implies that σ∗s = 1. However, since G is connected and the producer s is assumed to be the
node with highest disruption value, any follower of i would profitably divert resources to s,
until D∗i = D
e
i . Therefore, Di = D
e




We finally show that when G is connected, there can only exist one equilibrium where A
randomizes over more than one node. First, observe that when the attacker attacks multi-
ple players with positive probability, there exists only one optimal defence allocation from
their followers which makes the attacker indifferent to attacking any one of them. Thus, if
there is more than one equilibrium in mixed strategy, it must be that there exists at least one
defendant, say q, who, by deviating, would not strictly decrease his expected utility. Assum-
ing G is connected and producers are the nodes with highest disruption value, the attacker
would always attack one of the producers with positive probability. Since q is connected to
the producers and benefits from receiving goods from these, any deviation would not be pay-
off neutral and would not be profitable. Therefore, under these conditions, an equilibrium
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where the attacker attacks multiple nodes with positive probability must be unique.
Under certain conditions and when the attacker is strategic, the nodes, by following their
individual interests, optimally coordinate their actions and allocate defence resources such
that the expected network disruption is minimized. We explain the intuition by means of a
simple example. Consider a network of three nodes connected in a line, where a producer
sends a good to the other nodes via the second node. It is evident that the producer has
the highest disruption value, followed by the middleman and the sink nodes respectively.
Consider a planner owning three units of defence resources. The planner would allocate the
resources such that, if possible, the attacker would find it equally profitable to attack any one
of the three nodes; any other allocation would attract the attacker toward one of the nodes
with probability one, thus making it profitable for the planner to increase the defence of this
node. The planner can achieve this only by allocating resources proportionally to the nodes’
disruption values. Consider now the decentralized problem where each node is endowed of a
unit defence and assume that the middleman has received more defence than in the planner’s
allocation. Then, the attacker must find it profitable to attack the producer with probability
one, and consequently the rest of the nodes would find it profitable to reallocate some of their
defence to the producer. Similar argument holds if the node who initially benefited from more
resources was either the middleman or the last node of the line. In other words, individual
players would redistribute resources in order to maximize their chance of receiving goods
from the producer, and this problem, under the conditions stated, coincides with minimizing
the expected network disruption, which is the goal of the central planner.
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Two examples where conditions for Proposition 2 do not hold and thus decentralized and centralized
allocations might differ. In (a), player q is the node with highest disruption value despite not being a producer.
This might lead to under-protection of q since the producers do not strictly benefit from defending q. In (b),
producer j does not reach all the players. This might lead to under-protection of j. For instance, a planner
might be able to allocate n resources making the producers equally attractive while this might not be reached
in a decentralized setting.
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More specifically, two conditions are sufficient in order to obtain the result. First, the
producer(s) is(are) required to be the node(s) with highest disruption value. This is always
the case if O is singleton but not necessarily when there are more than one producers. If
this was not the case, we might have a middleman with highest disruption value who, in a
decentralized setting, might not receive defence from his predecessor nodes thus potentially
getting lower defence than in the planner’s allocation. Again, we clarify this point with a
simple example. Suppose two producers send goods to a unique middleman node q, who
in turn connects them to other n ≥ 1 players (see Figure 1a). It is easy to see that Ṽq, the
disruption value of the middleman, is the highest in N. However, in a decentralized setting,
we know that q would certainly receive defence only from himself and n followers since the
producers do not strictly benefit from sending resources to q. This implies that if the CP
would optimally allocate Des < 1 to each producer and Deq > n + 1 to q, the centralized and
decentralized defence allocations might differ.11 By assuming networks where the producers
exhibit the highest disruption value, we exclude these cases and guarantee the result.
Observe that we can easily quantify the highest inefficiency which could arise when the
conditions stated in the Proposition do not hold. This is observed when a planner would
allocate all n resources to one player q, while in a decentralized setting, q would receive
resources only from mq < n peers. In such a case, we can calculate the difference in the
expected disruption between the two settings as
τ = Ṽq(α(n)− α(mq))
where n−mq > 0 if for instance |Bq| ≥ 1, or q has at least one predecessor. For instance, when
q is a middleman and the player with the highest disruption value, and a planner would
allocate n resources to q, there is a decentralized equilibrium where all q’s predecessors and
other players not depending on q do not transfer resources to q. In such a case, the price of
anarchy, or the cost of a decentralized allocation in terms of higher expected disruption, is the
highest. In the previous example, n−mq = |Bq|, thus the highest price of anarchy would be
τ = Ṽq(α(n)− α(n− |Bq|)).
The second sufficient condition to obtain the result is that the producers need to be able
to reach the rest of the nodes in N - the network is connected. Again, this is always the
case when there is only one producer but not necessarily when more than one (see Figure
1b). If this condition is not holding, we might get an outcome similar to the case of two or
11If Des = 0 there exists a decentralized equilibrium where both producers send their resource to q since this
would not affect their expected payoff. Therefore, the allocations certainly differ only if Des ∈ (0, 1).
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more separate components of different size; a planner might still allocate defence such that
the attacker is indifferent to attacking two or more players from distinct components while
in a decentralized setting this might not happen when they are different in size. Intuitively,
players from different components would not strictly benefit from sharing resources between
them, thus decentralized and centralized allocation might differ.
Consider now scenario S0, and in particular assume that each node i can be attacked
according to a probability distribution P(i).
Proposition 3. Consider scenario S0. For any given G and probability distribution P(i), the equi-
librium profile S∗D is such that each node i sends resources to nodes j ∈ Psi with s ∈ O and such that
Ṽj > 0 proportionally to their probability of being attacked pj. Moreover, if pi > 0 for all i ∈ N and
G is a directed acyclic graph, the equilibrium defence allocation is unique.
Proof: Suppose a path Psj from a producer s to node j where each node in Psj is essential to
j to receive goods from a producer. Node j will allocate d∗jq to q ∈ Psj in order to maximize





with q ∈ Pij. Thus, d∗jq must be proportional to pq. Suppose a direct follower of j, node k ∈ Fj
such that jk ∈ L, who depends on j to receive the good from s. Node k will allocate resources
to nodes in the path Psk in order to maximize the probability β2, computed as
β2 ≡ pkαk(Dk) + ∑
q
pqαq(Dq)
= pkαk(Dk) + β1
Thus, any amount 1− d∗kk optimally allocated by k to the nodes q ∈ Pij will maximize β1, thus
d∗kq will be proportional to pq. On the other hand, if a player q is not essential to k despite
being in a path Psk - there exists at least another path P′sk connecting k to a producer - then
node k’s chances to receive the good from s do not depend on the existence of q, thus d∗kq is
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not proportional to pq and it is likely to be equal to zero.12 Finally, observe that if pi > 0
for all i ∈ N and G is directed and acyclic (DAG), then the equilibrium defence allocation is
unique since in a DAG, each node depends on his predecessor nodes, if any, to receive goods
from the producers. This implies that each node solves the problem of optimally allocating
resources over a unique path as previously seen. Moreover, by assuming γ ∈ (0, 1], the
objective function has a unique maximizer since it would always consist of a sum of strictly
concave functions.
In other words, players share defence resources with others in order to minimize the
probability of disruption of paths connecting them to producers. Each node composing
a unique path is equally essential to receive the good. Thus, the only element determin-
ing the defence received by a crucial node from other peers is the probability of being at-
tacked, independently of his disruption value. The example in Figure 2 should clarify this
point. Player 1 is the unique producer while player 2 is a middleman node. Consider beliefs
{p1 > p2 > 0, p3 = p4 = 0}. Since player 1 is essential to all players and p1 > p2, we
expect them to allocate more to 1 than 2 (D∗1 > D
∗
2 ). Moreover, this is feasible since more
players depend on 1 than 2, or Ṽ1 > Ṽ2, so there will be enough of them willing to satisfy the
condition D∗1 > D
∗
2 . Consider instead beliefs {p2 > p1 > 0, p3 = p4 = 0}. We know that
player 1 would always receive at least d∗41 = 1 and d
∗
11 = 1, so D
∗
1 ≥ 2. Player 3 will then
optimally transfer d∗32 = 1 to 2, and 2 will allocate d
∗
22 = 1 to himself, so D
∗
2 = 2. Therefore,








4 = 0), which implies levels D
∗
i not proportional to
i’s disruption values.
Figure 2: Node 1 is a producer node while node 2 is a middleman node.
This example anticipates the following result. Consider again a central planner who aims




12It is enough to assume pi > 0 for at least one node i essential to k to be connected to any producer to
guarantee d∗kq = 0. If there is no such node, sending resources to q would never affect the payoff of k, thus we
cannot exclude an equilibrium where d∗kq > 0.









Proposition 4. In general, for probability distributions P(i) such that pi > 0 for all i ∈ N, the CP’s
optimal allocation differs from the decentralized one.
Proof: We prove the statement for a simple network of n = 2 nodes but the argument can be
easily extended to the generic case of n > 2 nodes. Consider a producer s sending goods to a
player i. Assume probability pi of i being attacked and thus (1− pi) the probability of s being
attacked. If possible, the CP will allocate Ds and Di such that the expected disruption (1−
pi)(1− α(Ds))Ṽs + pi(1− α(Di))Ṽi is minimized. Assume that the total resources available













Consider now the decentralized equilibrium allocation where each node owns d = 1 defence
resource. We know that the producer will always allocate a unit resource to himself, thus
d∗ss = 1, and we only need to check d∗is. Node i will choose d
∗
is in order to maximize the chances
to receive and consume the good from s, or the probability (1− pi)α(1 + dis) + piα(1− dis).








with equality holding if and only if pi < 1/2, while for pi ≥ 1/2 we get the corner solution
d∗is = 0. When pi = 0, it is trivial to see that S
∗
D = D
e, or when the producer is attacked with
probability one, the equilibrium and efficient allocation coincide. Let’s assume a probability
distribution over the nodes P(i) such that pi > 0 for both the nodes.
Observe that by increasing pi from 0, the difference Des −D∗s > 0 increases, or the equilib-
rium allocation increasingly under-protects s compared to the efficient level. We show that
this is true up to pi = 1/2. Define p̃ the probability to get i attacked such that Des = 1. This
probability is unique and it is easy to check that p̃ > 1/2. We also know that D∗i = 1 for any
pi ≥ 1/2 since the equilibrium would imply d∗ii = d∗ss = 1. This means that up to pi = p̃,
it must be Des > D∗s , while for pi ≥ p̃ it must be that Des ≤ D∗s , with equality holding when
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pi = p̃. In other words, up to pi = 1/2, the equilibrium allocation increasingly under-protects
s compared to the efficient level. For pi > 1/2, this difference is still positive but shrinking
and eventually, when pi ≥ p̃, it becomes negative, i.e. the producer is over-protected in equi-
librium compared to the efficient level. Therefore, the equilibrium allocation is efficient only
if pi = p̃ and then Des = D∗s = 1.
Finally, generalizing for the case of n ≥ 2 nodes, there exists a unique distribution P̃(i)






for all pairs (i, j) ∈ N2. Such distribution will also imply an equilibrium efficient allocation
where D∗i = 1 for all i ∈ N if Ṽi ≥ Ṽj for all i and j such that j ∈ Fi. In other words, if the
probability of being attacked satisfies condition (2) for each pair of players and each player
has weakly lower disruption value than his predecessors, if any, then they would not find it
profitable to transfer their defence resources to other peers; by allocating resources to some
predecessor who is attacked with lower probability, a player would not maximize the chance
of receiving goods from a producer. Thus, D∗i = D
e
i = 1 for all i ∈ N, or S∗D = De.
Contrary to the strategic scenario, under S0 it is likely that the decentralized defence may
result in a sub-optimal allocation. This is mainly due to the fact that the planner would take
into account the disruption value of each node while individual players would base their al-
locations purely on P(i). In particular, we can say that the equilibrium allocation is efficient
only in two cases. First, when the attacker attacks the unique producer with probability one.
In such case, it is intuitive to see that the nodes and the planner have all aligned objectives.
Second, under a unique and specific probability distribution where the nodes are attacked
with probability inversely proportional to their disruption values and these follow the topo-
logical order in G, which is a follower cannot have a disruption value strictly higher than his
predecessor. In such case, we also know that the efficient equilibrium allocation will imply
D∗i = 1 for all i ∈ N. The intuition goes as follows. When nodes are attacked with probability
inversely proportional to their disruption values, an individual’s best response will be to allo-
cate her own resource to herself. The planner will generally allocate resources proportionally
to both the nodes’ probability of being attacked and to their disruption values. Therefore, the
(unique) probability distribution over the nodes which guarantees that the planner would as-
sign equal “values” to each node is also the distribution where decentralized and centralized
allocation coincide.
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For example, consider again the network in Figure (2) and assume a random attack such
that pi = 1/n for all i. Equilibrium allocation is D∗i = 1 for all i, with d
∗
ii = 1, or each
node allocates full resource to himself. A central planner would instead allocate resources







De 6= S∗D. On the other hand, suppose p1 = 1. Then, D∗1 = De1 = n, or the decentralized and
centralized equilibrium defence allocation trivially coincide. Consider now the probability
distribution P̃(i) = {0.09, 0.18, 0.36, 0.36}. Then, S∗D = De and such that D∗i = 1 for all i ∈ N.
In fact P̃(i) is the unique distribution where pi > 0 for all i such that S∗D = D
e.
5 Discussion
5.1 Welfare implications of link-modification
We ask how a link modification in G may impact a general utilitarian measure of welfare. In
other words, which network architecture does maximise the welfare of the players in N? We
assume hereafter strategic scenario S1.
Given the equilibrium strategy profile (S∗D, S
∗
A), define the set of potential target nodes T ⊂
N as T = {i ∈ N : D∗i > 0}. This is the set of nodes who, in equilibrium, own positive
defence resources and therefore must be potential targets of the attacker.





A, G) = ∑
i∈N
σi[α(D∗i )(V(G)−V(G− i)) + V(G− i)]
In other words, the welfare of players in N coincides with the expected total network value
given targets T and defence allocation S∗D. Note that any network G which in equilibrium
maximizes W(S∗D, S
∗




A, G). This implies that by studying the
changes in the attacker’s equilibrium expected payoff, we can also infer the relative changes
in welfare.
We observe that by simply increasing the size of T, more nodes will own positive defence
resources. This means that, since the total amount of defence resources in N is finite, sharing
it among relatively more nodes would decrease the defence ability of each individual node.
Therefore, any increase of size of the potential target-nodes set will increase the attacker’s
expected payoff in equilibrium.
To see this more clearly, suppose that given a network G in equilibrium T was a singleton
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set. According to Proposition 1, this implies that the target is a producer s and gets resources
from all the rest of the nodes, thus D∗s = n. Suppose now G′ 6= G obtained from G by
modifying its link structure and such that T′ is not anymore singleton. We can be certain that
in the new equilibrium, s will be part of the targets, and that D∗i < n for any player i ∈ T′ and




′) = (1− α(D‘∗s ))Ṽs > (1− αs(D∗s ))Ṽs = φ(S∗D, S∗A, G). It follows the next result:
Proposition 5. A network structure maximizes the welfare of the players in N only if T = O.
In other words, for a given set of producer nodes O, any architecture maximizing the welfare
of players in N will not include middleman nodes (see Figure 2).
(a) G (b) G′
Figure 3: In the graph G, the producer i (white node) is also the only potential target node (T = {i}), thus he
will receive defence resources from the rest of the peers (D∗i = 5). In G
′, the producer i still has maximal
disruption value but now D∗i = 3.2 since the middleman j (green) is also critical enough for the rest of the
nodes and he will get D∗j = 1.8 (T
′ = {i, j}). The expected payoff of the attacker is higher in G′ than in G.
We may also ask whether it is welfare improving to share the production among multiple
nodes. Consider a star-graph G with one central producer node, say s, and (n− 1) peripheral
nodes. For n large enough, the unique equilibrium profile implies that the attacker will attack
s with probability one and D∗s = n. Consider now the following alternative architecture.
Suppose that same unit produced by the unique producer in the star-graph is produced by
multiple nodes in equal share, say m ∈ (1, n) producers. Each producer is connected to the
rest of (n − 1) nodes, thus forming a core-periphery structure (see Figure 3a). We may ask
under which condition is profitable in terms of welfare to share production among m nodes.
Let’s assume that m is small enough such that (S‘∗D, S
‘∗
A) is such that A randomizes over
the m producers. It is easy to see that when each core-node is connected to n − 1 nodes,
we would always increase the expected welfare since W(S∗D, S
∗
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G is the star-graph and G′ the core-periphery graph with m > 1 producers in the core. In
















for all m ∈ (1, n).
(a) Core-periphery (b) Star (c) Non-full Core-periphery
Figure 4: The total production is constant and equally shared between producers when more than one. In (a),
the removal of one producer would have relative small impact since the rest of n− 1 nodes could still receive
half of the production from the second producer. In (b), the unique producer is maximally defended but his
removal gets the highest network disruption. In (c), the removal of one producer gets high disruption although
not as high as in (b).
This is fairly intuitive since although in G′ each producer has smaller defence ability than the
unique producer in G, they also create smaller disruption in case of elimination by A, and the
second effect always dominates the first.
Suppose now that each producer is equally connected only to a fraction of peripheral
nodes (see Figure 3c). We call this architecture a non-full core-periphery structure. In such case,
the conclusion is less clear. In Figure (4) we plot the welfare functions for the star-graph, the
core-periphery and the non-full core-periphery with m > 1 producers providing the goods
for (n − m)/m peripheral nodes each. We can see that there exists a level m∗ below which
the star-graph with a unique central producer yields higher welfare than the non-full core-
periphery graph. In other words, when we share the production among a few core nodes
and we make each of them the middleman for a small group of nodes, they may not receive
enough defence resources but they may still have relatively high disruption value.
This point can be particularly relevant if we aim to construct a network architecture which
maximizes the welfare of i ∈ N and we assume a positive marginal cost per-link. We noted
that a core-periphery graph with m > 1 producers is clearly the most resilient disruption-
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minimizing network, but it is also the most “expensive” structure requiring m(n− 1) active
links. This means that, if c is relatively large, non-full core-periphery architectures may also
not necessarily be superior to a star graph (m = 1) for mainly two reasons; firstly, the total cost
of a non-full core-periphery graph with m > 1 producers is c(n− 2m + m2), which increases
with m, and is clearly higher than the minimal cost c(n− 1) of a star graph. Secondly, for a
too small m, we have seen that the disruption value of each producer is too high, thus sharing
defence resources among m increases the expected payoff of the attacker. Hence, for a given
positive cost c, the range of m for which a non-full core-periphery is superior to a star-graph
in terms of welfare is even smaller than in absence of cost per-link, i.e. there exists a high
level c under which the star-graph yields higher welfare than a non-full core-periphery for
all m > 1.
Figure 5: The core-periphery graph gives the highest welfare. The star graph is preferred to the not full
core-periphery graph for relatively small m, or when the total production is shared among relatively few
producers.
5.2 Variable costs
In the main section we made an important assumption regarding the cost of defence. De-
fendants owned a fixed amount of defence resources and their choices were not concerned
with its production but only with its allocation. In other words, defence was a sunk cost.
This might not be a safe assumption when describing security choices such as immunization
decisions but a realistic one in other cases. For instance, in response to a specific threat, a
government might not be able to produce new military resources in the short run but only be
able to reallocate existing units to different “fields”.
In general, allowing for transfers between agents, we can identify two potential sources of
inefficiency and thus divergences between decentralized and centralized security allocations.
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Inefficiencies might arise due to differences between individual and centralized defence-
production (over or under-investment in security by single players), and/or due to differ-
ences in the redistribution of existing defence resources across players. As previously noted,
the first case has been extensively analysed in the literature. In the previous section we fo-
cused on the second source of inefficiency, and in order to fully disentangle the two, we
assumed sunk costs and allowed for transfers between nodes.
For completeness, here we discuss the possibility of producing defence at a constant
marginal cost. We start by analysing the case with no transfers of security between nodes.
We assume hereafter that the attacker is strategic.
Consider a marginal cost c > 0 per unit of defence produced by a node. Without loss of
generality, assume vi(G) = 1 for all i ∈ N receiving a good from a producer and a unique
producer s. When not specified, the setting is the same as the one previously discussed. In
the first stage, each defendant simultaneously chooses her own defence di ∈ [0, ∞). In the
second stage, the attacker chooses a target. In the next result, we show that an equilibrium
exists only for high enough c and, when it does, it implies under-security compared to the
efficient level.
Proposition 6. For cost c ≥ c̃, an equilibrium exists and implies that the attacker attacks the node(s)
with highest disruption value. Moreover, the decentralized equilibrium defence profile exhibits under-
protection compared to the centralized one.
Proof: First, observe that there exists a unique level d = d̃ such that
(1− α(d̃)) = α′(d̃)
since (1− α(0)) = 1 while limd→0 α′(d) = ∞, both functions converge to zero for d→ ∞, and
both decrease monotonically. Moreover, d̃ is finite since (1− α(d)) decreases at lower rate
than α′(d). Define c̃ the level
c̃ ≡ (1− α(d̃)) = α′(d̃)
We show that for c ≥ c̃ an equilibrium exists an it is such that σ∗i = 1 with i the node with
highest disruption value, d∗i such that α
′(d∗i ) = c, and d
∗
j for all j 6= i such that (1− α(d∗j ))Ṽj =
(1− α(d∗i ))Ṽi− ε with ε positive and infinitesimally small.13 It is easy to see that when σi = 1,
13If there exists more than one node i with highest disruption value, σi = σ > 0 for all these nodes i.
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i would not find profitable to decrease d∗i . Moreover, i does not find it profitable to increase
her defence since when c ≥ c̃, d > d∗i implies both (1− α(d∗i )) < c and α′(d) < c where
(1− α(d∗i )) would be the marginal benefit from attracting A to other locations. Thus, i does
not profitably deviate from d∗i . Any player j 6= i does not find profitable neither to reduce
d∗j , attracting A toward her location which is also less protected, nor to increase production,
since it would only increase cost without changing A’s target. Finally, given d∗i and d
∗
j for all
j 6= i, the attacker clearly finds profitable to attack i with probability one, thus the defence
and attack profile described define an equilibrium profile.
We now show that the equilibrium defence production is not efficient and in particular
that in the decentralized setting the nodes under-invest in defence. It is easy to see that a
central planner would choose the optimal defence level for the node i, dei , such that α
′(dei ) =
c/Ṽi, or taking into account the disruption value of node i. Similarly to the decentralized
case, dej for any j 6= i will be the protection level satisfying Ṽj(1− α(dej)) = Ṽi(1− α(dei )) if
possible, otherwise dej = 0. The attacker’s best response will be to randomize over j nodes
and i. To see that this is an equilibrium, observe that any deviation where di < dei would
clearly be not profitable. Moreover, since the planner would always try to make A indifferent
over i and j, any allocation where di > dei would be dominated by D
e.
Finally, this implies that the decentralized defence of i is smaller than the efficient level
since, dei = kd
∗




Moreover, this also implies that dej ≥ d∗j , with equality holding only when dej = d∗j = 0.
The intuition is simple. There are two reasons why a player might want to increase pro-
duction of her own defence. First, if targeted by the attacker, this would increase the chance
his chance of survival. Thus, the player might want to produce defence until the marginal
benefit from increasing this probability is worth the cost of an extra unit of defence. Second,
defence choices are strategic complementary since by increasing his own defence, a player
might attract the attacker toward other locations. Thus, a player would increase his own de-
fence if the marginal benefit from increasing his probability of survival when he succeeds in
attracting A to other locations, from α(d) to 1, is greater then the cost to produce an extra
unit of defence. When the cost c is relatively high, this second marginal benefit is smaller
than the first one. This implies that the optimal defence of a targeted node would be the level
equalizing the marginal benefit from increasing probability of survival to the marginal cost c.
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Moreover, the target will necessarily be the player with highest disruption value since the rest
of the players are always able to attract A toward this node even with lower defence levels.
For completeness, we show that for c < c̃, we do not reach an equilibrium. First, observe
that if c < c̃, then (1− α(d̃)) = c > α′(d̃). Say that i was producing di such that α′(di) = c
and again dj where (1− α(dj))Ṽj = (1− α(di))Ṽi − ε. Production cost is now low enough to
make it profitable to i to increase di in order to attract A toward j, or 1− α(di + ε) > c with
ε positive and small. This is true up to di = d̃i such that (1− α(d̃i)) = c. If d̃i is produced
by i, then best response of j will be to produce d̃j such that (1− α(d̃j))Ṽj = (1− α(d̃i))Ṽi − ε,
and again A would still find it profitable to attack i with probability one. However, at this
point i would profitably decrease di to the initial level satisfying α′(di) = c condition, since
it would not affect the attacker’s response while bringing to the optimal levels of protection,
and j consequently would decrease their defence levels too at the initial levels dj. Therefore,
we obtain a cycle dynamic and fail to reach an equilibrium profile.
Finally, observe that the result does not change when we allow for transfers of defence
resources between players; a node benefits from producing and transferring resources to an-
other node until the marginal benefit from increasing probability of surviving an attack of
that player is equal to the marginal production cost, thus D∗i = d
∗
i for all i ∈ N. However,
by giving the possibility of transferring resources, we will always obtain multiple equilibria;
each level D∗i > 0 can be obtained by the individual contribution of i and/or of any node
depending on i to receive goods from a producer. Since it is always the case that the node
with highest disruption is such that Ṽi > vi, we always face multiple equilibria.
In summary, assuming a strategic attacker and a marginal cost c high enough to guaran-
tee the existence of an equilibrium, we expect a decentralized production of defence which is
strictly lower than the efficient one. This is the case irrespective of the possibility of sharing
resources between nodes. This result, together with those in the previous section, suggest that
in a decentralized and strategic setting, inefficiencies in security are likely to arise from indi-
vidual production choices and not from the sharing of resources. Moreover, the inefficiency
expected from an individual player is proportional to the player’s decentralized equilibrium
production. Which is dei − d∗i ≥ dej − d∗j for any pair of nodes such that d∗i ≥ d∗j . This sug-
gests that, all things being equal, a structure with a relatively large number of middleman
nodes (e.g. a line network) would present larger discrepancies between decentralized and
centralized total protection than a network with fewer middleman nodes.
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6 Conclusion
One of the main insights from the literature on games of Conflicts on Multiple Battlefields is
that decentralized allocations of defence resources may not be efficient since individual play-
ers fail to internalize the negative externalities of their allocation choices and thus over-invest
in defensive measures. This has also been confirmed under certain conditions in network set-
tings, or when defendants are connected by a network structure which can be attacked and
destroyed by strategic attackers.
We have studied a game from the same family where connected players are endowed of
defence units which can be shared between them. We show that if the attacker is strategic
(S1), the decentralized allocation of defence resources may be efficient, or it may coincide
with the optimal centralized allocation chosen by a central planner which aims to minimize
the expected network disruption. On the other hand, in the non-strategic scenario (S0), the
decentralized allocation is likely to be not efficient. This difference is due to the fact that while
in S1 players (non-cooperatively) coordinate their actions by taking into account the disrup-
tion values of the players in the network, in S0 they do not since the likelihood of an attack
on a player is independent of his disruption value. These results lead us to the conclusion
that under strategic scenarios network structures may coordinate individual defence choices
to efficient allocations by imposing a common goal on the agents, i.e. survival of network
flows.
We also discuss how the network architecture may impact the final welfare of the defen-
dants. Reducing the number of middleman (non producer) players, or players which are
crucial to the flow of the goods through the network, is always welfare improving. Core-
periphery structures with producers as core players may be optimal due to their relative
low expected disruption but may be expensive to sustain when the core is particularly large
and each connection costly. Non-full core-periphery architectures (each core player linked
to other core players but only to a fraction of peripheral ones) may be optimal (second-best)
only when the core is large enough and the cost per-link relatively small.
Finally, we explore the impact of a variable cost of defence production. In line with part
of the literature, we show that when an equilibrium exists, it implies under-investment in
defence by each player. This is a direct consequence of the fact that players fail to internal-
ize the impact of their elimination on the rest of their peers. This result, together with the
previous ones, suggest that under certain conditions inefficiencies in decentralized security
choices arise at individual production level and not at the redistribution of existing defence
resources.
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Dziubiński, Marcin, & Goyal, Sanjeev. 2017. How do you defend a network? Theoretical
Economics, 12(1), 331–376.
Goyal, Sanjeev, & Vigier, Adrien. 2014. Attack, Defence, and Contagion in Networks. The
Review of Economic Studies, 81(4), 1518–1542.
Heal, Geoffrey, & Kunreuther, Howard. 2004. Interdependent security: A general model. Tech.
rept. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hong, Sunghoon. 2011. Strategic network interdiction.
Israeli, Eitan, & Wood, R Kevin. 2002. Shortest-path network interdiction. Networks, 40(2),
97–111.
Jackson, Matthew O, et al. 2008. Social and economic networks. Vol. 3. Princeton university
press Princeton.
Kalai, Ehud, & Zemel, Eitan. 1982. Totally balanced games and games of flow. Mathematics of
Operations Research, 7(3), 476–478.
Decentralised Defence of a (Directed) Network Structure 27
Keohane, Nathaniel O, & Zeckhauser, Richard J. 2003. The ecology of terror defense. Springer.
Kovenock, Dan, & Roberson, Brian. 2010. Conflicts with multiple battlefields.
Kunreuther, Howard, & Heal, Geoffrey. 2003. Interdependent security. Journal of risk and
uncertainty, 26(2-3), 231–249.
Lapan, Harvey E, & Sandler, Todd. 1993. Terrorism and signalling. European Journal of Political
Economy, 9(3), 383–397.
Reijnierse, Hans, Maschler, Michael, Potters, Jos, & Tijs, Stef. 1996. Simple flow games. Games
and Economic Behavior, 16(2), 238–260.
Sandler, Todd, & Enders, Walter. 2004. An economic perspective on transnational terrorism.
European Journal of Political Economy, 20(2), 301–316.
Sandler, Todd, et al. 2003. Terrorism & game theory. Simulation & Gaming, 34(3), 319–337.
Smith, J Cole. 2010. Basic interdiction models. Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and
Management Science.
Tullock, Gordon. 2001. Efficient rent seeking. Pages 3–16 of: Efficient Rent-Seeking. Springer.
Varian, Hal. 2004. System reliability and free riding. Pages 1–15 of: Economics of information
security. Springer.
Washburn, Alan, & Wood, Kevin. 1995. Two-person zero-sum games for network interdic-
tion. Operations Research, 43(2), 243–251.
Wood, R Kevin. 1993. Deterministic network interdiction. Mathematical and Computer Mod-
elling, 17(2), 1–18.
Zhu, Shanjiang, & Levinson, David M. 2012. Disruptions to transportation networks: a re-
view. Pages 5–20 of: Network reliability in practice. Springer.
